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The information quality of mandatory ﬁnancial reporting depends on two fac-
tors: (1) Are standards appropriate to produce ﬁnancial statements that provide
investors with suﬃcient information? (2) Is compliance to standards enforced by
appropriate institutions?
This paper addresses the question if ﬁrms should be able to create hidden
reserves as an example for the eﬀect of standards on information quality. The
analysis shows that rational investors are able to correctly decipher ﬁnancial
statements – independent of the standards in use. The question of suﬃcient
enforcement proves to have a deeper impact on the quality of information.
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Most national Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) as well as the Inter-
national Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) of the International Accounting Stan-
dards Board (IASB) are rejected by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
as proper accounting rules for mainly two reasons: (1) Institutions to enforce compli-
ance to these rules are not suﬃciently strict. (2) Financial reports based on these
standards do not provide the capital market with suﬃcient information to value assets.
One important part of this criticism – that applies to German GAAP, for instance –
refers to the possibility to create hidden assets: If ﬁnancial statements may include
undisclosed reserves, bad performance might be camouﬂaged by their amortisation.
In consequence, the SEC denies ﬁrms’ who do not apply US-GAAP access to American
stock exchanges. In addition there is a debate – to a good deal of political nature –
among practitioners about the impact of accounting institutions and the best way
to design them. However, the eﬀects of accounting institutions on the information
content of mandatory disclosures has not been addressed in the theoretical accounting
literature.1 Especially the fact that ﬁrms by submission under a set of standards have
committed themselves to a certain disclosure pattern has not been taken into account as
most papers consider ﬁrms’ disclosure incentives within a setting of voluntary reporting.
A main part of this literature takes – following Milgrom’s (1981) seminal signaling
model – as given that ﬁrms report in compliance to the standards in force (truthfully)
if they report at all. These models focus on the question which ﬁrms would be willing
to disclose information. For this class of models see, for instance, Verrecchia (1983,
1990), Dye (1985, 1986), Wagenhofer (1990), Feltham and Xie (1992) or Shin (1994).
Another part of the literature on voluntary reporting addresses the question of infor-
mation quality of disclosures if the disclosure’s content cannot be checked by third
parties. These models are based on Crawford and Sobel’s (1982) cheap-talk game and
discuss the inﬂuence of the receiver of the disclosed information as well as reputational
issues (see, for instance, Farrell and Gibbons (1989), Sansing (1992), Gigler (1994),
Stocken (2000) or Wagenhofer (2000)).
1To a small scale such a discussion started out after prominent cases of fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting
like Enron and Parmalat, but that debate abated before it came to real life.
2Only recently the issue of truthfulness of ﬁrms’ reports has been discussed within
models that connect both parts of the literature on voluntary disclosures (see, for
instance, Fischer an Verrecchia (2000), Kleinert (2004), or Korn (2004)).
The fact that theorists have not contributed to the explanation of ﬁrms’ mandatory
reporting decisions shows in Fishman and Hagerty’s (1998) survey on “mandatory
disclosures”. Most of the surveyed literature deals with voluntary reporting. The eﬀect
of an obligation to provide ﬁnancial statements is only covered by “reference equilibria”.
The possibility that mandatory information might be biased is not considered. This
state of the literature leads Dye (2001, p. 184) to the deﬂated perception “...that there
is, presently, no received theory on mandatory disclosures in accounting...”.
This paper aims at providing a ﬁrst model of ﬁrms’ incentives to bias disclosed infor-
mation under a setting of mandatory reporting. To that end I consider the interaction
between an owner of a ﬁrm who is willing to sell his ﬁrm and potential investors. This
interaction is monitored by a regulator who demands that the owner discloses informa-
tion about the ﬁrm’s value before the sale and enforces compliance of this disclosure
to a certain set of standards. I analyse two diﬀerent scenarios of compliant behavior:
1. If the regulator wants to cap ﬁrms’ balance sheet total, disclosures that report the
true ﬁrm value or less are considered as compliant. Such a standard is likely to be
found in a ﬁnancial system where ﬁrms traditionally employ a high debt-equity
ratio (for instance, Germany). In that case creditors have to be protected against
owners who claim to skim of proﬁts but in fact withdraw capital from the ﬁrm.
Therefore, keeping the balance sheet total low is a means to curb the amount of
money that can be legally taken and, thus, represents creditors’ interests. This
regime is called “information cap” throughout the paper.
2. If the regulator wants ﬁrms to produce an exact statistics of their ﬁrm value,
only disclosures that reveal the true ﬁrm value are considered as compliant. Such
a standard is likely to be seen in a ﬁnancial system with low debt-equity ratios,
especially if ﬁrms are widely held (for instance, the US). In that case ﬁnancial
statements are the main information source for investor’s investment decisions.
They should therefore give a clear and reliable account of current performance.
To prohibit the creation of hidden assets (that can be secretely released in years
of underperformance) is seen as a means to guarantee high information quality.
This regime is called “exact information” throughout the paper.
3Each of these rules is enforced by imposition of a ﬁne in case of non-compliance. Thus,
ﬁrm’s information policy and ﬁrm prices are parts of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
whose structure depends on the regulation in use. The paper addresses two questions:
(1) Are there diﬀerences in the quality of information provided by both systems? In
consequence: What are costs and beneﬁts to be expected from a change of regimes?
(2) How does enforcement impact information quality?
The analysis to follow, thus, concentrates on the issue of information content of ﬁnancial
statements. The setting under consideration is therefore kept as simple as possible: I
analyse a single transaction between an owner-manager who wants to sell his ﬁrm and a
group of potential buyers. The owner-manager (compulsorily) provides information to
the potential buyers. This setting allows to examine the incentives to choose a biased
report under diﬀerent standards and enforcement institutions – without the additional
impact of reputational considerations that have to be taken into account if annual
reporting is addressed.
It shows that the information content of ﬁnancial reports does not materially diﬀer
across regimes. If potential investors use information in a rational way, they will
be able to evaluate it almost equally well under both scenarios. This result may be
applied to the current dispute about ﬁnancial reporting standards between the IASB
(whose standards leave more room for underrepresentation) and the SEC. In the process
started out with 2002’s Norwalk Agreement both institutions evaluate diﬀerences in
their standards as well in their enforcement and aim at a convergence of both systems.
The analysis suggests that the discussion overestimates the eﬀect of tight standards in
relation to the eﬀect of impending sanctions.
2 The Model
Consider an entrepreneur who owns a ﬁrm of value zero. There is a proﬁtable in-
vestment opportunity that could raise the ﬁrm value, but the entrepreneur lacks the
necessary capital. Therefore, he decides to sell the ﬁrm to more potential investors.
In the beginning, information about the investment opportunity’s value is distributed
as in classic disclosure models: The owner knows the exact value of the ﬁrm x (the
owner’s “type”). To the potential investors, the ﬁrm value is the realization of a
4random variable X. This random variable follows a distribution F with strictly positive,
atomless density f over the interval [x,x] of possible ﬁrm values. The distribution
function is common knowledge.
The seller must disclose the value of the ﬁrm. Formally, it is assumed that he can
select a (possibly false) signal y ∈ [x,x]. The information is not immediately veriﬁable
to third parties. This assumption has a serious impact on the equilibrium behavior of
the owner as well as of potential investors, as overstatement of future proﬁts cannot
be excluded.
Assume that a regulator monitors the capital market. The regulator aims at enforcing
compliance to a certain set of standards. In what follows I consider two diﬀerent
scenarios: (1) The given set of standards puts a cap on admissible reports of the ﬁrm
value. In that case the regulator considers any report y ∈ [x,x], where x is the true
value of the ﬁrm, as compliant reporting. (2) The given set of standards aims at
producing the exact value of the ﬁrm. In that case the regulator only accepts y = x,
where x is the true value of the ﬁrm as compliant reporting.
To enforce compliant reporting, the regulator checks a random sample of reports in
detail. Thus, the owner expects that his report will be checked with (exogenous)
probability ϕ. If he reports in non-compliance to the standards, the regulator can prove
the misreporting – although it is not exactly veriﬁable – by ‘circumstantial evidence’.
In that case the owner can either be actually convicted of fraudulent behavior, or, if
the evidence is not suﬃcient for a conviction, he may have to meet a payment (to a
charitable trust or the like) in the course of a settlement out of court.
The punishment in case of a detection depends on the reporting bias as well as on the
set of standards in force. These relations are captured by the deﬁnition of a deviation
of a compliant report and by the assumption that expected punishments are convex
in the deviation. In the scenario of an information cap all (detected) over-reportings
y > x are punished and the punishment function is given by K(y|x) = ϕk(y − x)2 if
y > x. In the scenario that demands exact information any biased report y  = x is
punished according to K(y|x) = ϕk(y − x)2.
In either case the punishment must be born by the original owner and thus does
not reduce ﬁrm value. The punishment function consists of two components: The
constant k measures the severity the regulator (and the capital market which punishes
5a misreporting manager by a loss of credibility, for instance) attaches to misreporting as
such. Here, any convex function supports the results in the analysis to follow. I choose
the quadratic form for sake of tractability.2 The constant part of the punishment is
exogenous to the model. The analysis to follow is based on a comparative statics about
the parameter k.
The question arises, why does the defrauded investor not claim damages, at least in
those cases in which the seller is convicted? A consideration of damages would not
change the equilibrium behavior or results. Thus, I do not consider such payments.
For a discussion of that point see Korn (2004, p. 148).
Having received the owner’s signal, the potential investors update their beliefs about
the ﬁrm’s value. If investors observe the signal y, they form posterior beliefs: They
substitute the prior density by the conditional density fh(x | y) according to Bayes’
rule whenever possible. If Bayes’ rule does not apply (out of equilibrium), fh(x | y) can
be chosen in an arbitrary way. Based on these posterior beliefs the market determines
the ﬁrm’s price P(y). I assume that investors behave rationally and that the capital
market is competitive, i.e., the price equals the conditional expected ﬁrm value.
This argument follows a rational expectations general equilibrium approach. However,
for the game theoretic formulation used in this paper, a detailed description of player’s
beliefs at any possible path of the game is necessary. Therefore, I assume that potential
investors bid for the ﬁrm in a sealed-bid second price auction in which bids are based
on the investors’ posterior beliefs. The resulting equilibrium bids and the equilibrium
price are the same as in a rational expectations model.
3 Analysis
This section derives equilibrium reporting and bidding strategies for both information
regimes. Afterwards, I compare the information content of the resulting equilibria.
2Note that the important feature is the distinction in two regions: For minor false reports the
impact of the punishment is smaller than that of a linear function (with slope 1); for higher false
reports the impact is higher than that of a linear function. The cut determines the exact values of
the thresholds described in the following.
6Independent of the punishment in use, the information about the ﬁrm’s value is not
veriﬁable. Thus, the investors must establish a rule on how to ‘read’ the owner’s signal.
I search for rules which lead to consistent behavior, i.e., for beliefs supporting Perfect
Bayesian Equilibria. I start with equilibrium properties that are common to both
scenarios under consideration.
Korn (2004) shows that in the case of voluntary disclosures a limited punishment for
lying destroys the classic disclosure principle. This result remains valid under both
scenarios of mandatory disclosure considered here. If investors expect full disclosure,
they must bid P(y) = y. Anticipating this bidding behavior, the owner can proﬁtably
overstate ﬁrm value because the cost of lying (the imminent punishment) is (at least for
small lies) smaller than the gain from lying. This result is independent of the potential
investors’ prior information.
Lemma 1 If the penalty for misreporting is ﬁnite, truthful disclosure is not part of an
equilibrium.
Proof: All proofs can be found in the appendix.
Given that truth telling cannot be equilibrium behavior, investors will form beliefs that
correct the announced ﬁrm value for the expected amount of overstatement. All equi-
libria that are derived in the following sections consist of pooling as well as separating
reporting strategies and the corresponding bidding strategies. They are derived by a
two-step procedure:
1. I assume that all types of ﬁrm owners overstate their true ﬁrm value and use a
separating reporting strategy. I derive investors’ optimal bidding behavior given
such a separating strategy and determine the functional form of the reports and
bids.
As an overstatement is sanctioned by the same punishment function under both
regimes, this step is the same for both scenarios.
2. I show that a separating reporting strategy may not be a best response for the
best and for the worst ﬁrm types. These types prefer to be pooled (with other
good resp. bad types). The exact determination of the pooling regions depends on
7the punishment function in use. Therefore, step two of the analysis is presented
separately for each scenario.
Step1:
If potential investors expect that the ﬁrm owner reports according to the separating
strategy y(x) and they observe the signal ˆ y, they will bid y−1(ˆ y). If in turn the owner





−1(ˆ y) − ϕk(ˆ y − x)
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This equation has inﬁnitely many solutions that take the form
y(x,d) =
1 + LambertW(−2dϕke−1−2ϕkx) + 2ϕkx
2ϕk
, (2)
where d ∈ [0, 1
2ϕke−x2ϕk] is a parameter of integration.3 For each parameter d there is
a separating reporting strategy that maximizes (1) if potential investors expect this
reporting strategy. For the parameter value d = 0 a linear reporting strategy y =
x+α = x+
1
2ϕk results. Figure 1 depicts examples of separating reporting strategies.
The parameter of integration d is a merely technical parameter. Thus, non of the
reporting strategies y(x,d) with d ∈ [0,
1
2ϕke−x2ϕk] can be excluded from the analysis for
economic reasons. Therefore, the determination of perfect Bayesian equilibria of the
reporting game has to consider multiple (inﬁnitely many) possible reporting strategies.
The analysis shows that the game has inﬁnitely many equilibria based on reporting
strategies as in (2).
Step 2:
To complete the description of an equilibrium based on the reporting strategy y(x,d),
it has to be shown if y(x,d) is a best response for every type of owner. This is not the
case as may – as a ﬁrst example – be seen from the linear reporting strategy.
If the investors and the ﬁrm owner coordinated on the linear reporting strategy, an
owner of type x would report according to y(x,0) = x + 1
2ϕk and investors would
“read” any signal y as “the true ﬁrm value is y − 1
2ϕk”. They would update their
3The function LambertW(x) is not a very common function. It is therefore presented in some









The ﬁgure depicts separating reporting strategies for the following set of parameters:
ﬁrm values are distributed on [0,7], the monitoring probability is ϕ = 0,1, the
punishment parameter is k = 2.
A linear reporting strategy results for the parameter of integration d = 0. It has the
form y(x,0) = x + 1
2ϕk. The maximal value for d in the given setting is d = 2.5. If
the ﬁrm’s reporting strategy follows y(x,2.5), the worst type x = 0 reports his true
value. All other types choose an over-reporting strategy.
The ﬁgure does not cover all details of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium as in equilib-
rium very bad and very good types consider a pooling strategy.
Figure 1: Examples of separating reporting strategies
beliefs accordingly (using Bayes’ rule) and bid P(y) = y − 1
2ϕk. The ﬁrm owner would





2ϕk)2 as he would have over-reported. To show that a
report according to y(x,0) is not a best response for all ﬁrm types, I take a closer look
at the interval boundaries.
First, consider an owner of type x ∈ [x − 1
2ϕk,x]. These types of owner cannot report
according to x + 1
2ϕk as this report would exceed x . Thus, they will choose a feasible
report that is as close as possible to x + 1
2ϕk, which is y = x. A rational investor takes
account of this restriction and updates his belief to the conditional expectation over all
types who would be willing to choose y = x. Thus, in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
9the best types report y = x, obtain a price that equals the average value of all types
choosing y = x, and pay an expected ﬁne K(x|x) = ϕk(x − x)2. Only intermediate or
low types consider the linear reporting strategy y(x,d) = x + 1
2ϕk.
A similar argument applies to any other reporting strategy y(x,d), d  = 0. As the
over-reporting for good types is close to that under the linear reporting strategy (cf.
the characterization of y(x,d) on p. 27), the considerations are almost the same un-
der linear and non-linear reporting strategies. A detailed analysis of the (upper-end)
segmentation of the type interval is given in sections 3.1 and 3.2.
Now, consider the worst ﬁrm type x. An owner of this type would obtain an expected
overall payment of x − ϕk(
1
2ϕk)2 if he followed the linear reporting strategy y(x,0) =
x + 1
2ϕk. What would happen if the owner deviated from that strategy and reported
y = x (the truth)? From the investors’ point of view this report would be an unexpected
signal (given the assumption that all types of owner report according to the linear
strategy). Therefore, they would have to build new beliefs. The worst case from the
owner’s point of view is that investors assume that the signal y = x was sent by
the worst ﬁrm type. Thus, they, will at least bid P(x) = x. As the owner reported
truthfully, he does not have to consider a punishment and obtains an overall payment
of at least x. Consequently, in equilibrium an owner of type x does not report according
to the linear reporting strategy.
A similar consideration applies to an owner of type x + ε. As for this type the signal
y = x is not a truthful report, the diﬀerent sanctioning mechanisms under the scenario
of an information cap and that of exact information have to be considered to determine
a segmentation at the lower end of the type interval. The same applies to equilibria
under non-linear reporting strategies. The corresponding analysis is given in sections
3.1 and 3.2.
3.1 Information cap
The above considerations have – by use of the example of y(x,0) – shown that ﬁrm




10This section gives a detailed description of perfect Bayesian equilibria based on
diﬀerent reporting strategies under the assumption that reports are admissible if
they are not higher than the true ﬁrm value. Thus, I assume that over-reporting is
punished according to K(y|x) = ϕk(y − x)2 and that under-reporting is considered as
compliant reporting. I show that the size of the pooling regions at the lower and the
upper end of the type interval depends on the expected punishment (in particular on
k) and on the reporting strategy in use.
First, I consider the reporting alternatives of the owner if the value of his ﬁrm is
close to the lower boundary of the type interval. If the owner reports according to
y = (x,d), his overall payment will not depend on other types’ behavior. The investors
detect the true value of his ﬁrm, bid the true value x, and the owner has to pay the
expected ﬁne K(y(x,d)|x) = ϕk(y(x,d)−x)2, leading to an expected overall payment
of πy(x,d)(x) = x − ϕk(y(x,d) − x)2. If the owner chooses under-reporting, i.e. if he
reports y = x, potential investors will bid the conditional expectation over all types
who choose y = x. In the case of an information cap such an under-reporting remains
without punishment. Therefore, if ˆ x is the best type whom the potential investors
expect to report y = x, the overall payment of the owner given the reporting strategy
y = x is
πx(x) = E(X|X ≤ ˆ x). (3)
Thus, an owner of type x has to compare his payment if he is the best type reporting
y = x with the payment if he reports according to y(x,d). The size of the lower-end
pooling region is determined by the type x
1;d












A similar consideration applies to types close to the upper interval boundary. If po-
tential investors expect type ˆ x to be the worst type who reports y = ¯ x, they will bid
E(X|X ≥ ˆ x) if they observe y = ¯ x. As y = ¯ x is an overstatement for all types except
¯ x, an owner of type x < ¯ x has to face an expected punishment of K(¯ x|x) = ϕk(¯ x−x)2
4Truthful reporting is not a relevant alternative, as it is excluded as equilibrium behavior by Lemma
1.
11if he uses this over-reporting strategy. Thus, the expected overall payment given the
reporting strategy y = ¯ x is
π¯ x(x) = E(X|X ≥ ˆ x) − ϕk(¯ x − x)
2 (5)
if ˆ x is the worst type choosing y = ¯ x.
The size of the upper-end pooling region is determined by the type x
2;d
k,cap who is in-















Thus, the principle structure of an equilibrium under an information cap based on a
reporting strategy y(x,d) consists of three layers: Bad types report y = x and are
pooled, intermediate types choose an over-reporting according to y(x,d), and good
types choose y = ¯ x and are pooled. This structure is represented in Figure 2. The
above considerations cannot exclude the case that no type chooses y = y(x,d). If,
for instance, the threshold type x
1;d
k,cap who is indiﬀerent between under-reporting and
reporting according to y(x,d) would prefer the signal y = ¯ x to a report according to
y(x,d), investors will only observe y = x or y = ¯ x. Which signal can actually be part
of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium depends on k an d and is subject to a comparative
static analysis to follow.5
5A comparative static analysis concerning the eﬀect of the punishment should cover ϕ and k.
However, I consider ϕ as a “long-run variable” and k as a “short-run variable”. This is due to the
idea that ϕ covers frictions in the regulator’s ability to actually monitor the market like, for instance,






















      
Punishment
The graphics should be read starting at the subinterval in the middle.
All types x belonging to that interval will report according to y(x,d) =
1+LambertW(−2dϕke−1−2ϕkx)+2ϕkx
2ϕk . The capital market will read this behavior and
bid x. Due to the misreporting the owner must account for a possible punishment.
For types in the subinterval [x,x
1;d
k,cap] the expected punishment if reporting accord-
ing to y(x,d) would lead to an overall payment smaller than P(x). Thus, they
prefer to claim to be of the worst ﬁrm type and to be pooled. Types in the interval
(x
2;d
k,cap,x] cannot report according to y(x,d) as this would surpass x. Thus, they
choose the report closest to y(x,d), which is x. These types are pooled and expect
a punishment.
Figure 2: Generic equilibrium partition under an information cap
The bidding behavior used in the above equilibrium description rests upon a rational
use of information. I assume that potential investors update their beliefs concerning
the ﬁrm’s value using Bayes’ rule whenever possible. To complete the description of
investors’ behavior, I have to describe their beliefs if they observe a signal which should
not be part of an equilibrium. This speciﬁcation is part of a formal presentation of each
equilibrium. Such a presentation covers the reporting strategies for all ﬁrm types, the
equilibrium and out-of-equilibrium beliefs of potential investors, and the corresponding
bidding behavior: In an equilibrium based on the reporting strategy y(x,d) an owner of
type x ∈ [x,x
1;d





to y(x,d), and an owner of type x ∈ (x
2;d
k,cap,x] reports y = x. Potential investors build
the following posterior beliefs:
13Equilibrium beliefs:







1, x = y − 1
2ϕk + de−y2ϕk,
0, x  = y −
1
2ϕk + de−y2ϕk,
“Bad” types choose y = x and are pooled
(lower-end pooling region):
















“Good” types choose y = x and are pooled
(upper-end pooling region):




k,cap), x ∈ (x
2;d
k,cap,x],










1, x = x,





1, x = x,
0, x ∈ (x,x].
(6)
Investors bid their conditional expectation based on the given posterior beliefs. De-




k,cap] may be degenerate.
To start a comparative static analysis of the possible equilibrium segmentations of
the type interval, I ﬁx the punishment parameter k and compare reporting strategies
based on diﬀerent parameters of integration d. As can be seen from Figure 1, the
amount of over-reporting decreases for each ﬁrm type x under y(x,d) if d increases.
Accordingly, the expected punishment decreases as well. In consequence, the lower-end
pooling region in an equilibrium based on y(x,d) is smaller the higher the corresponding
parameter d. This relation is shown in Figure 3. For the sake of simplicity the ﬁgure is
based on a uniform distribution of ﬁrm values. As can be seen from the ﬁgure as well,
the size of the upper-end pooling region is bigger the higher the value of d.
Unfortunately, the comparative statics over d cannot be used for an immediate nor-
14The ﬁgure depicts the structure of perfect Bayesian equilibria under an infor-
mation cap based on the reporting strategies shown in Figure 1. Here it is





k,cap , and x
1;2.5
k,cap assign the boundaries of the lower pooling
regions resulting from the corresponding reporting strategies. Analogous val-
ues could be assigned for the upper pooling regions. These values have been
omitted in the ﬁgure for sake of clarity.
Figure 3: Boundaries of the lower-end pooling regions under an information cap
15mative result as d is a technical factor and not a parameter that could be adjusted by
one of the players. However, the above consideration will prove to be useful for the
comparison of the basic scenarios “information cap” and “exact information”.
For a comparative static analysis over k I consider a ﬁxed parameter d and the cor-
responding reporting strategy y(x,d).6 For any type x ∈ [x, ¯ x] the reporting strategy
y(x,d) =
1+LambertW(−2dϕke−1−2ϕkx)+2ϕkx
2ϕk is strictly decreasing in k. For k close to zero
the owner would (if he followed y(x,d)) choose a very large over-reporting that would
exceed ¯ x. Thus, if the type interval – and in consequence the set of possible reports
– is bounded from above by x, the report y(x,d) is no longer an option for any type
x ∈ [x, ¯ x]. In that case even the worst type x must compare two alternatives only:
to bear the risk of paying k(x − x)2 and announce x or to choose the under-reporting
signal x and avoid a punishment. If the worst type (and, in consequence, all ﬁrm
types) announces x, the investors disregard the report. Therefore, they will keep to
their prior type distribution and bid E(X). This bidding behavior, in turn, makes it
useless for the owner to bear the cost of over-reporting. Since he will receive E(X) at
no cost if he chooses the compliant signal x, he will do so. However, if the worst type
prefers to choose x, an equilibrium will result in which some types choose x and some
x. Which strategy dominates for type x, depends on k. Thus, for low k a cheap talk
equilibrium results. For “intermediate” k there is a roughly separating equilibrium in









is degenerate). For high k the quality of the separa-
tion rises. In that case, y(x,d) is suﬃciently small such that it is a feasible strategy
for those types who are willing to over-report. In consequence, for high punishments,
y = x,y = y(x,d), and y = ¯ x can be observed in equilibrium. If k rises, the lower-end
and the upper-end pooling regions shrink. Accordingly, the higher the k the more
types can be truly recognized although they choose a biasing report. The described
equilibrium structure is formally presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 For any prior distribution F of possible ﬁrm values, the punishment
function K(y|x), and for any reporting strategy y(x,d) there are punishment parameters
kd
l (X) and kd
h(X) such that:






qualiﬁcation that for ¯ d = 1
2ϕke−x2ϕk an additional equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium there is no
pooling at the lower end of the type interval. Therefore, for ¯ d = 1
2ϕke−x2ϕk and a low or intermediate
k there is a partially separating equilibrium besides the equilibria characterized below.
161. For all k < kd
l (X) the system of beliefs (6) leads to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
without information transmission, i.e. all types of owner choose the signal y = x.
2. For all k ∈ [kd
l (X),kd
h(X)] the system of beliefs (6) leads to a perfect Bayesian




x, x ∈ [x,x
2;d
k,cap]
x, x ∈ (x
2;d
k,cap,x].
The threshold type x
2;d
k,cap ∈ [x,x] is a function of k and d as well as of the prior
distribution of ﬁrm values. Potential investors will bid E(X|X ≤ x
2;d
k,cap) if they
observe y = x, and they will bid E(X|X > x
2;d
k,cap) if they observe y = x.
3. For all k > kd
h(X) the system of beliefs (6) leads to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
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k,cap are functions of k and d as well as of the prior
distribution of ﬁrm values. Potential investors will bid E(X|X ≤ x
1;d
k,cap) if they
observe y = x, y−
1





they will bid E(X|X > x
2;d
k,cap) if they observe y = x.
4. For ¯ d =
1
2ϕke−x2ϕk there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where the lower-end
pooling region vanishes.
Discussion of the result:
If a regulation of ﬁnancial reporting covers the idea that admissible information should
be capped the size of the punishment for over-reporting has a material impact. Inde-
pendent of the punishment, the considered game has multiple equilibria. Therefore,
owner and investors have to coordinate on the way the game will be played. A game
theoretic analysis cannot predict how such a coordination may be done but the result
stresses the responsibility of potential users for the quality of ﬁnancial reporting. The
informativeness of diﬀerent equilibria – for a ﬁxed punishment – may be measured by
the size of the “separating area” of each equilibrium. As Figure 3 shows, this size may
substantially vary across equilibria.
The equilibrium structure is exactly the same as under a setting of voluntary disclosures
(cf. the results in Korn (2004)). Thus, the quality of mandatory reports materially
depends on the punishment following an over-reporting.
173.2 Exact Information
If the regulator wants to enforce ﬁnancial reporting that provides exact information,
he will sanction any report that deviates from the true ﬁrm value. Therefore, the pun-
ishment function in use is K(y|x) = ϕk(y − x)2, for all y  = x. Investors’ and owner’s
equilibrium considerations are basically the same as under the case of an information
cap with a material exception: The owner cannot send an under-reporting signal at no
cost.





, there is a threshold
type x
2;d
k,ex who determines the segmentation at the upper end of the type interval.
The indiﬀerence condition for this type is analogous to (5) as the punishment for
over-reporting is identical in the case of an information cap and the case of exact
information.
At the lower end of the type interval pooling cannot be excluded although under-
reporting is costly. This can easily be seen if the reporting incentives of type x are
considered. This type will not choose a signal according to y(x,d) as this signal would
be read by the investors as “the true ﬁrm value is x” and the owner had to face an
expected punishment.7
If type x chooses y = x he will at least receive P(x) = x and can avoid a punishment.
Type x + ε prefers y = x to y = y(x,d) as well although this type will have to face a
punishment of size K(x|x + ε) = ϕkε2 if he reports y = x.
Again, as in the case of an information cap potential investors build expectations which
types are going to report y = x and bid accordingly. Due to the expected punishment
for under-reporting the overall payment for type x if he reports y = x and investors
expect type ˆ x to be the best type to do so is (cf. equation (3))
πx(x) = E(X|X ≤ ˆ x) − ϕk(x − x)
2 (7)
In principle, the lower-end segmentation of the type interval based on reporting strategy
y(x,d) is now determined in the same way as in the case of an information cap: There
is a type x
1;d
k,ex who is indiﬀerent between reporting according to y = (x,d) and being
7The reporting strategy y(x, ¯ d), ¯ d = 1
2ϕke−x2ϕk is as before a special case as y(x, ¯ d) = x.

















But, in contrast to the scenario of an information cap it does not suﬃce to determine
the threshold type x
1;d
k,ex. It has also to be checked if y = x is a best response for
this type – which is not necessarily the case. The fact that under-reporting will be
punished if it is detected may lead to an overall payment for type x
1;d
k,ex that is smaller
than x. By reporting his true type, x
1;d
k,ex could reach an overall payment that amounts













to over-report, the signal y = x
1;d
k,ex cannot be part
of an equilibrium. Therefore, investors have to build out-of-equilibrium beliefs for this
signal. The worst they can assume, is that a type who reports y = x
1;d
k,ex owns a ﬁrm of
value x. Thus, if x
1;d









the equilibrium argument breaks down and there is no equilibrium based on y(x,d).8
Whether an equilibrium based on y(x,d) exists depends on the prior distribution of
possible ﬁrm values. Figure 4 depicts equilibrium segmentations for a uniform distrib-
ution. Here equilibria exists for all possible values of d. This property is common to
all scenarios with uniformly distributed types. If types are, for instance, distributed
according to simple other distributions like a combination of two uniform distributions,
some reporting strategies y(x,d) may not lead to equilibria.
So, to analyze the setting of exact information, the question remains to be answered
if there is an equilibrium for any possible parameter constellation? Existence of an
equilibrium is ensured due to the fact that there is an equilibrium where the worst
type x reports truthfully if the owner and the investors coordinate on the reporting
strategy y(x, ¯ d), ¯ d = 1
2ϕke−x2ϕk. In that case the lower-end pooling region vanishes and
only the signals y = x(x, ¯ d) and y = x can be part of an equilibrium.
8According to Lemma 1 there cannot be an equilibrium with truthtelling at the lower end.
19The ﬁgure depicts the structure of perfect Bayesian equilibria under the regime
of exact information based on the reporting strategies shown in Figure 1. The
remaining assumptions equal those from the example in Figure 3.
Figure 4: Boundaries of the lower-end pooling regions under exact informaton
20Thus, the principle equilibrium structure is similar to the structure under the regime
of an information cap. The owner has to weigh the expected price against impending
























      
Punishment
The graphics should be read in analogy to Figure 2. The material diﬀerence between
both ﬁgures lies in the overall payment obtained by an owner who claims to be of the
worst type. In contrast to the scenario with an information cap under-reporting gets
punished if exact information is demanded. If an equilibrium exists that is based
on the reporting strategy y(x,d) =
1+LambertW(−2dϕke−1−2ϕkx)+2ϕkx
2ϕk (i.e., if d is big
enough), the lower pooling region is smaller than in the corresponding equilibrium
in the case of an information cap.
Figure 5: Generic equilibrium partition under exact information
An equilibrium in the scenario of exact information covers the following reporting
strategies, equilibrium and out-of-equilibrium beliefs of potential investors, and bidding
behavior: In an equilibrium based on the reporting strategy y(x,d) – if it exists – an
owner of type x ∈ [x,x
1;d





according to y(x,d), and an owner of type x ∈ (x
2,;d
k,ex,x] reports y = x. Potential
investors build the following posterior beliefs:
21Equilibrium beliefs:







1, x = y − 1
2ϕk + de−y2ϕk,
0, x  = y − 1
2ϕk + de−y2ϕk,
“Bad” types choose y = x and are pooled
(lower pooling region):
















“Good” types choose y = x and are pooled
(upper pooling region):




k,ex), x ∈ (x
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k,ex,x],










1, x = x,





1, x = x,
0, x ∈ (x,x].
(9)
Investors bid their conditional expectation based on the given posterior beliefs. De-




k,ex] may be degenerate. Whether an
equilibrium based on a certain reporting strategy y(x,d),d ∈ [0, ¯ d] exists, is described
in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 For any prior distribution F of possible ﬁrm values and for any k there
is a threshold parameter d′
k ∈ [0, ¯ d = 1
2ϕke−x2ϕk] such that:
1. For all d ∈ [d′
k, ¯ d] there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium under the regime of
exact information that is based on the system of beliefs (9).
2. For d ∈ [0,d′
k) there is no partially separating equilibrium in pure strategies under
the regime of exact information.
The comparative static analysis with respect to d and k is the same as under an
information cap for those reporting strategies y(x,d) supporting an equilibrium.
224 Comparison between “Information cap” and
“Exact information”
Now, consider equilibria in both above given scenarios that are based on the same




exists for both scenarios (i.e., if the parameter d under consideration is
suﬃciently high), both equilibria are of the same structure:















report according to y(x,d) and are separated (i.e.,






report y = ¯ x and are
pooled.















report according to y(x,d) and are separated (i.e., investors






report y = ¯ x and are pooled.
Thus, equilibria that are enforced by the same punishment parameter and are based





As the punishment for over-reporting is identical in the case of an information cap and






The consideration of the lower-end threshold types diﬀers slightly. A ﬁrm type who
chooses under-reporting has to face a ﬁne under the regime of exact information but not
if information is only capped. The overall payment of a type who chooses y = y(x,d)






Thus, c.p. under the regime of exact information the set of types that can be truly
recognized by the investors is bigger than under the scenario of an information cap.
The magnitude of the diﬀerence depends on the prior distribution, the punishment
parameter k, and the parameter d.
23Although a comparison of equilibria based on the same reporting strategy shows that
the scenario of exact information provides a better information quality, it cannot be
said that this scenario performs unambiguously better.
First, which is a minor issue, for any punishment parameter k there there are inﬁnitely
many equilibria that diﬀer in their information quality. It may well be the case that
owner and investors coordinate under the regime of an information cap on an equilib-
rium with high information quality whereas under a regime of exact information they
would coordinate on an equilibrium with low information quality.
Second and more important, some of the reporting strategies y(x,d) underlying an
equilibrium under the regime of an information cap do not lead to an equilibrium
under a regime of exact information. Which are the “missing” equilibria? A presented
in the comparative static analysis in section 3.1, with an increase in d the lower-end
pooling region shrinks and the upper-end pooling region expands. As the reporting
strategies resulting from lower parameter values do not lead to an equilibrium if exact
information is demanded, the selection can be described as follows: The scenario of
exact information tends to result in a better information provision concerning low ﬁrm
types and a worse information provision concerning high types.
5 Conclusion
Diﬀerent sets of accounting standards put diﬀerent weight on the question if ﬁrms
should be allowed to under-report their performance. This paper has shown that the
handling of under-reporting does not signiﬁcantly impact the quality of information
provided as long as investors know the rules employed. One of the main simpliﬁca-
tions the model has used is the assumption that ﬁrm value is a single number that
can be determined for sure. As the ongoing scientiﬁc debate on asset valuation shows
this assumption does not reﬂect reality. Therefore, any conclusion drawn with respect
to accounting standards has to be quite careful. But as any set of accounting stan-
dards includes rules that are designed to prevent ﬁrms from under-representing their
performance, the principle considerations can be used.
During the last years ﬁnancial reporting standards have been undergoing a permanent
process of substantial changes and amendments. Especially the fact that European
24capital market oriented ﬁrms have to present their consolidated accounts in accordance
with IFRS means a substantial change for ﬁrms that hitherto had to comply to national
GAAP. In most cases the shift from national GAAP to IFRS led to a stricter demand
for exact reports of ﬁrm performance. US GAAP put even more emphasis on the need
to have a balance sheet that shows the exact value of a ﬁrm’s activities.
The equilibrium analysis of this paper shows that it is indeed possible to reach a better
information quality by a change of accounting standards towards a system that restricts
under-reporting. But the analysis shows as well that such an improvement neither is
sure nor does it come without a cost.
Independent of the standards in force owners and investors have to coordinate on the
way to play the information game. Therefore, in any case a change of the institutional
frame may provoke a reorganization that may well end up in an equilibrium with a
lower information quality. As seen a change may as well lead for sure to a change if
owner and investors coordinated under the less demanding system on an equilibrium
that is no longer feasible under a regime that demands exact reporting. Again, it is
unclear if this change leads to an improvement.
Therefore, the analysis allows for an interpretation that concentrates attention on
punishments instead of standards. Any improvement in information quality that can
be reached by a change in the set of standards can as well be reached by imposing more
severe sanctions on detected misreporting. As this would be a change within an existing
framework and not a change of the framework, the likelihood for a reorganization of
the capital market (with the above mentioned risks) is considerably lower.
A byproduct of the analysis results from a comparison between information quality un-
der voluntary disclosures are equivalent to mandatory disclosures under an information
cap. A ﬁrst interpretation of this result suggests that the missing “received theory of
mandatory disclosure” is possibly not missing as the achieved results do not rest on the
assumption of voluntariness: They can as well result from a system with mandatory
reporting and the possibility to under-report performance.
Taking a rather pointed view on the results one might ask why there are accounting
standards at all. If investors are aware of their responsibility to read ﬁnancial state-
ments carefully, there are equilibria that lead to high information quality. Revsine
(2002) has discussed that issue as a response to the Enron scandal. He suggests the
25following simple system of rules that looks appealing in the light of the above analysis.
“1. Clearly identify what standard your ﬁrm selected (i.e., LIFO,
straight-line depreciation, operating lease approach, etc.).
2. Does the standard you selected best reﬂect your ﬁrm’s economic cir-
cumstances and performance?
a. If “yes”, why?
b. If “no”, what equally acceptable alternative standards were rejec-
ted?
c. By how much would key ﬁnancial ﬁgures diﬀer using the equally
acceptable alternatives not chosen?
3. What is the justiﬁcation for the estimates your ﬁrm selected to make
the standard operational (e.g., useful life estimates by category for depre-
ciation purposes)? Explain, if applicable, any deviations from prevailing
industry norms.”
To implement such a simple set of rules is obviously impossible, as it would impose high
costs of information acquisition on each individual. But this suggestion highlights the
role of the information user in ensuring information quality. It, thus, could contribute
to the public debate on the quality of ﬁnancial statements.
26Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with full disclosure, investors must update their
beliefs to fh(x|y = x) = 1, fh(x|y  = x) = 0. Their bidding price will be P(y) = y.
Thus, if the owner announces his true type x, he receives x. If he overstates his expected
proﬁts by ε, he receives independent of the punishment function in use x + ε − ϕkε2.








Thus, for any ﬁnite k and positive probability ϕ there is an incentive to overstate
expected proﬁts. ￿
Proof of Proposition 1:
As the signal y = x can be chosen at no cost, equilibria if an information cap is
imposed, are equivalent to those under voluntary disclosure – except for the fact that
under voluntary disclosure the bad types choose the signal y = y0 instead of y = x.
Korn (2004, p. 152-158)) gives a proof for the case of the linear reporting strategy.
The material property used in the proof is the fact that the reporting strategy is
strictly increasing. Thus, the corresponding proof for a comparative statics based on
a reporting strategy y(x,d),d  = 0 is analogous to the given proof – with obvious
amendments for the threshold values. ￿
Properties of LambertW(x) and y(x,d):
1. LambertW(x) is deﬁned as the solution of f(x)   ef(x) = x that is analytic in 0.
LambertW(x) maps [0,∞) monotonically increasing and concave to [0,∞). As
Figure 6 shows, it resembles a “compressed” natural logarithm.
2. Any reporting strategy y(x,d) =
1+LambertW(−2dϕke−1−2ϕkx)+2ϕkx
2ϕk is as well strictly
increasing and – with the exception of y(x,0) which is a linear function – strictly
concave. y(x,d) is the inverse of x = y − 1
2ϕk + de−y2ϕk. The connection to the

















Figure 6: Shape of LambertW(x)




2ϕk(y−x). Its values are drawn from an exponential function. Therefore, d is
always nonnegative independent of the set of parameters under consideration.
4. For ¯ d = 1
2ϕke−x2ϕk a reporting strategy y(x, ¯ d) results such that the worst type x
reports y = x. For any d > ¯ d the worst type would choose a report y(x,d) < x.
As such a report can be eliminated by the assumption of individual rationality,
parameter values above ¯ d are excluded from the analysis.
5. If d decreases, the report of the worst type increases. The linear reporting strategy
y(x,0) leads to the maximal overstatement of y = x + 1
2ϕk.
6. For any parameter d the reporting strategy y(x,d) converges for x → ∞ (“expo-
nentially fast”) to x + 1
2ϕk.
7. Therefore, the material diﬀerence between reporting strategies is given by their
curvature at the lower end of the type interval (s. Figure 1).
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